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PROPOSITIONS ACCOMPANYING THE THESIS
THE EVOLUTION OF BELIEFS AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR
BY DANIEL CHRISTOPHER OPOLOT
1. The strength of evolutionary game theory lies in its ability to not only explain
how (Nash) equilibrium comes about but also make unique predictions when-
ever multiple equilibria exist.
2. Social institutions and technologies can undergo incremental change in soci-
eties where individuals are sparsely connected; when individuals are highly
connected, only radical changes are likely (Chapter 3 & 4).
3. Short expected waiting times to long-run stable outcomes imply longer mixing
times (Chapter 4).
4. Heterogeneity in public opinions is more likely with rational than with bounded-
rational actors (Chapter 5).
5. Persuasion is the key to consensus (Chapter 5).
6. “Learning is the transformative process of taking in information that when
internalized and mixed with what we have experienced changes what we know
and builds on what we can do. It’s based on input, process, and reflection. It
is what changes us.” (Marcia Conner; The New Social Learning: A Guide to
Transforming Organizations Through Social Media.)
7. In physical sciences, universal laws describe relationships between physical
phenomena. In social sciences, universal laws should aim at describing how
relationships between social phenomena evolve.
8. The best way to stay sane throughout the course of PhD is to never focus on the
final outcome, but rather learn to celebrate the smallest of achievements; like
coming up with an appropriate title for your paper.
9. The pursuit of knowledge may seem hopeless, but it sure is eternal.
